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Exploring the Conservatism
of Federal Appeals Court Judges
CHARLES M. LAMB*

Since the publication of Sheldon Goldman's pioneering article in
1966,1 application of quantitative techniques has increasingly characterized examinations of judicial behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals.' Despite this progress, problems have been encountered. One
associated difficulty has been that tools used for investigating Supreme
Court behavior are not automatically applicable to the appeals courts,
which normally are characterized by shifting three-judge panel memberships and infrequency of dissent.'
*B.S. 1967, Middle Tennessee State University; M.A. 1970, Ph.D. 1974, University of
Alabama; Research Scientist, The George Washington University Program of Policy Studies
in Science and Technology.
Although the author is solely responsible for this article's conclusions, he expresses his
appreciation to Professors Sheldon Goldman and Glendon Schubert for reviewing its contents.
1
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, 60 Am.
PoL. Scr. REv. 374 (1966).
2 For studies of the courts of appeals appearing since Goldman's article of a decade ago,
see R. R cHARDsoN & K. VirNs, MaE PoLrrcs or FEDERAL CouRTs: LOWER COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES ch. 6 (1970); M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND's COURT (1970); Atkins, Decision-

Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals, 25 WEsT. PoL.
Q. 626 (1972); Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Towards Conformity in a Three
Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 54
Soc. Sc. Q. 41 (1973); Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of Appeals:
The Question of Issue Speculation, 27 WEST. POL. Q. 409 (1974); Atkins & Zavoina, Judicial Leadership on the Court of Appeals: A Probability Analysis of Panel Assignments in
Race Relations Cases on the Fifth Circuit, 18 AM. J. POL. Sci. 701 (1974); Carrington,
Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and
National Law, 82 HARv. L. REv. 542 (1969); Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1968 Wis. L. R.v. 461; Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U. CIN-. L. REv. 635 (1973); Goldman,
Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the Lower Federal Courts: Some Socio-Political Perspectives, 34 J. PoL. 934 (1972); Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts
of Appeals, 1967 Wis. L. Rxv. 186; Goldman, Judicial Backgrounds, Recruitment, and the
Party Variable: The Case of the Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the United States District and Appeals Courts, 2 APiz. ST. L.J. 211 (1974); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 Aar. PoL. Sci. REv. 491 (1975); Howard, Litigation
Flow in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 8 LAw & Soc. Rv. 33 (1973); Lamb, The
Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, 60 CoRNrL
L. REv. 743 (1975); Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense-Judicial Philosophy
and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Appeals, 24 Am. U.L. Rav. 91 (1974); Richardson
& Vines, Review, Dissent and the Appellate Process: A Political Interpretation, 29 J. POL.
597 (1967); Schick, Judicial Relations on the Second Circuit: 1941-1951, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv.
939 (1969).
3
R. RicnDsoN & K. VnrTs, Tax PoLiTIcs or FEDERAL CouRTs, supra note 2, at 13839; Vines, Judicial Behavior Research, in APPROACES TO TE

125, 137-38 (M. Haas & H. Kariel eds. 1970).
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Estimating degrees of conservatism and liberalism on the courts
of appeals has met another serious problem. These concepts have traditionally been measured in Supreme Court research through cumulative
or Guttman scaling.4 Theoretically, scaling is appropriate for any court
which is composed of a minimum of five members, reports its votes,
and decides a substantial number of cases nonunanimously.5 Yet it is
inapplicable to collegial bodies whose membership is constantly shifting.
Years ago Glendon Schubert suggested a potential solution to this
dilemma-the possibility of scaling en banc appeals court decisions. 6
Most students of judicial behavior nevertheless continued to assume that
en banc decisions of a single court would be so scant as to preclude
scaling.7
This assumption has recently been nullified in large measure by
the research of Burton Atkins, as well as through further work by
Professor Goldman. In 1972 Professor Atkins successfully scaled en
banc criminal decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit for the period 1956-1962.' Goldman, reporting even
greater success in 1975, scaled en banc civil liberties decisions for six of
the eleven courts of appeals for the period 1965-1971.1 This article seeks
to extend the cumulative scaling applications of Professors Goldman
and Atkins by exploring the value of time and issue subscales for
measuring changing attitudinal tendencies of appeals court judges.
Specifically, two hypotheses derived in part from their work are tested.
The first hypothesis is now quite conventional, although mixed
findings have emerged. 10 It is that the attitudes of judges grow more
4 See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: ATTITUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPRE
COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 cbs. 5-6 (1965); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED:
PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY ch. 4 (1974); G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR ch. 5 (1959); Schmidhauser, Judicial Behavior

and the Sectional Crisis of 1837-1860, 23 J. POL. 615 (1961); Spaeth, Judicial Power as a
Variable Motivating Supreme Court Behavior, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. Sc. 54 (1962); Tanenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1583 (1966); Ulmer,
Supreme Court Behavior and Civil Rights, 13 WEST. POL. Q. 288 (1960).
5 See W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC LAW 137 (1972).
6 See G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 4, at 20;
G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING 185 (1965).
7 See, e.g., S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

163 (1971).
8 Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of
Appeals, supra note 2, at 636.
9 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2, at
495-96. See also Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, supra note 2, at 652-56.
10 Compare G. SCHUBERT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITY 118-29 (1970) with Ulmer,
Dimensionality and Change in Judicial Behavior, in 7 MATHEMATICAL APPLICATIONS IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE (J. Herndon & J. Bernd eds. 1974) and Ulmer, The Longitudinal Behavior of Hugo Lafayette Black: Parabolic Support for Civil Liberties, 1937-1971, 1 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 131, 135 (1973). See also Yarbrough, Justice Black and His Critics on
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conservative over time in broadly defined areas of the law. The second is
an extension and refinement of the first-that although judges become
more conservative over time, their growing conservatism varies according to specific questions within broader legal areas." As in the study
reported by Atkins, criminal decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit were selected for examination. 2 But unlike the Atkins study, emphasis is on a longer time period and includes
specific as well as general criminal issues.
In the final analysis, the intention of this article is to contribute further to the progress in appeals court research by presenting a perspective
somewhat different from that typically pursued in recent years. Professor Goldman concluded in 1975 that "judicial behavior of appeals court
judges [should] be interpreted as representing gradations of broadly defined political and economic liberal-conservative attitudes."' 3 To appreciate fully the complexities of judicial behavior, these gradations should
also be carefully examined according to varying individual attitudinal
propensities over time and with respect to specific issues. The notion here,
then, is that comprehension of these two facets of judicial behavior
provides a meaningful complementary way of probing the judicial
mind and its relationships to judicial policy. Such an approach supports
the more general conception of voting behavior as explained by broadly
defined political and economic attitudes. In other words, at least two
major approaches to understanding judicial attitudes are clearly useful.
One is that of Goldman, whose analysis is undertaken at the "aggregate
Speech-Plus and Symbolic Speech, 52 TExAs L. Rnv. 257, 261-71 (1974); Yarbrough, Justices

Black and Douglas: The Judicial Function and the Scope of Constitutional Liberties, 1973
Dv'E L.J. 441, 442-3.
11
Professor Goldman recently proposed that future research further investigate the age
variable:
The age variable presents a special challenge for judicial behavior. The variable,
after all, is a dynamic one, and the age hypothesis seems to suggest that judges
grow more conservative as they grow older. This proposition deserves closer scrutiny
using the voting records of individual judges... . [However], the age variable is
likely to be troublesome even as scholars undertake painstaking analyses of actual
changes in the voting behavior of individual judges over time.
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2, at 505.
2 For additional work dealing totally or in part with voting behavior on the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity
Defense-Judicial Philosophy and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Appeals, s-upra note
2, at 115-24; Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure,
1956-1969, supra note 2, at 750 n.30, 770 n.134, 780 n.188; Loeb, Judicial Blocs and Judi-

cial Values in Civil Liberties Cases Decided by the Supreme Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 146 (1965). See
generally Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, supra note 2; Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 19611964, supra note 1.
13 Goldman, Voting Behavior on the US. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2,
at 504.
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level."' 14 A second is followed here-a more in-depth attitudinal exploration into one court and its judges, particular periods of time, and specific
as well as general issue-areas. Professor Goldman's work is now evolving
to the point of perhaps furnishing "a theoretical framework . . . that
will suggest which of the background variables one should attempt to
relate to behavior."15 This article generally seeks to apply a complementary approach to the age variable at a more limited level of analysis.
RESEARCH DESIGN

Judicial conservatism and liberalism have been shown to describe
political, social, and economic predispositions, with each made up of
subcomponents." One attitudinal subcomponent involves a judge's views
toward criminal law and procedure, and is part of the so-called C scale.'
As is customary, conservatism is operationally defined here in terms of
judicial votes cast against criminal appellants in nonunanimous cases,
that is, votes supportive to the federal government. Conversely, votes for
appellants and contrary to government arguments in split decisions are
considered reflections of liberalism.' 8 Conservative and liberal voting
14 Id. at 505.
15 Id.

16 See G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING, supra note 6, at 125-30. For critical
comments on the use of conservatism and liberalism for describing and explaining judicial
behavior see, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT IN THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 112-113 (2d ed. 1969); T. BECKER, POLITICAL BEHAviORALISM AND MODERN
JURISPRUDENCE:

A WORKING THEORY AND STUDY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 25 (1964);

Becker, Inquiry into a School of Thought in the Judicial Behavior Movement, 7 MIDWEST
J. POL. ScI. 254 (1963).
Critical observations by such knowledgeable individuals as Professors Abraham and
Becker cannot be ignored. A central problem involves the fact that "conservatism" and
"liberalism" are at times employed in an imprecise, undefined manner. This understandably
invokes questions of meaning and validity. Scholars, as a consequence, are often skeptical
of the concepts' popular usage. Moreover, some writers appear to conscientiously avoid
references to conservatism and liberalism in their research. This practice is due to the
limitations of the concepts, and to difficulties in defining their meanings and measuring
their presence or intensity. These are real, substantial problems.
Nevertheless, this article accepts the position that to reject conservatism and liberalism
as labels without adequate substitutes does not solve the problem. Such a rejection merely
creates a significant conceptual void. This article therefore maintains that with acceptable
operational definitions, carefully collected data and accurate calculations, conservatism and
liberalism are valid concepts for examining lower court voting behavior and for testing the
proffered hypotheses. Conservatism may be, as Clinton Rossiter has written, "one of the
most confusing words in the glossary of political thought. . . 2" C. Rossiter, CONSERVATISM
IN AMERICA: THE THANKLESS PERSUASION 5 (2d ed. 1962). But this is far from saying

that it should be abandoned when there is a lack of a more suitable attitudinal concept
available.
17 See G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 4, ch. 5; G. SCHUBERT, THE
JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED, supra note 4, ch. 1.
18 These are standard definitions. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 4, at 86; Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States
Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, supra note 1, at 375-76. See also the application of related
definitions in H. GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE
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tendencies are measured, with attitudes of judges inferred from that
voting behavior. Since the defendant is ordinarily appealing a conviction,
this definition indicates that usually a conservative vote favors affirmation of the lower court, while a liberal vote is for reversal. 9
Turning from definitions to methodology, cumulative scaling requires only a brief explanation because of its widespread application.20
Professor Schubert's basic guidelines for scale construction are generally followed,2 ' with more recent elaborations and criticisms considered.2" According to Professor Schubert, as well as other practitioners,
valid cumulative scales arrange court decisions involving related issues
along an ordinal continuum of attitudinal intensity. The data is cumulatively ordered. This means that a judge's vote for the appellant (or the
government) in case X normally indicates he also voted favoring appellants (or the prosecution) in cases to the left (or right) of X. With
acceptable coefficients of reproducibility (CR) and scalability (CS),2
JUDICrA ROLE 49 (1971); S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE
238 (1969); Way, The Study of Judicial Attitudes: The Case of Mr. Justice Douglas, 24
WEST. PoL. Q. 12, 13, 17 (1971). However, in some instances these definitions cannot be
reliably applied without analyzing the cases carefully. In other words, "[w]hether in each
and every case a vote for or against the claim of the underdog party is a manifestation of
liberalism or conservatism is open to question." Danelski, Toward Explanation in Judicial
Behavior, 42 U. CINN. L. REv. 659, 662 (1973). For the attempt to resolve this problem
here see notes 27, 29, & 31 supra and text accompanying.
'o One should also note that votes of judges on the District of Columbia Circuit are
viewed only in relation to each other. Conservatism and liberalism on another court could
conceivably differ in meaning and intensity. Moreover, these operational definitions cannot
"discern the intensity of the claims presented in the litigation." Goldman, Voting Behavior
on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964, supra note 1, at 376. Nor can they
take into account the importance or impact of one particular criminal decision when compared to another. See Mendelson, The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process:
A Critique, 57 Am. POL. Sci. R v. 593, 595 (1963).
20
See note 4 supra.
21 G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 4, at 280-90.
22
See, e.g., S. KRISLOV, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A LABORATORY
MANUAL 104-22 (1972); W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at 126-40; J. SPRAGUE,
VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPRENE COURT:

CASES IN

FEDERALISM, 1889-

1959 ch. 1 (1968); W. TORGERSON, THEORY AND METHODS OF SCALING (1958); Schubert,
Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial, 29 J. POL. 3 (1967); Tanenhaus, supra
note 4.
23 Customarily, the lowest acceptable CR and CS are .90 and .60 respectively. The
CR is calculated by dividing the number of inconsistencies by the total number of participations, excluding cases with single dissents. This fraction is then subtracted from one (1),
giving the CR. The CS is computed by dividing the total number of inconsistencies by the
total possible number of inconsistencies. This fraction is then subtracted from one (1), giving the CS. For the meaning of "total possible number of inconsistencies," see W. MuRapt& J. TANENHAUS, supra note 5, at 134. The CS was adopted to compensate for the infltion of the CR caused by extreme votes at the margins of scales. See Menzel, A New Coefficient for Scalogram Analysis, 17 PUB. OPINION Q. 268 (1953); Ulmer, Scaling Judicial
Cases: A Methodological Note, 4 Amr. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 31 (1961).
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the data suggest unidimensionality.24 In other words, judges' votes in
cases are largely accounted for by the particular variable under consideration. From successful scaling efforts one may infer that the scale
portrays intensity of liberal and conservative attitudes of court members
toward the issue.26
With respect to data collection and classification, reliance is placed
upon the "descriptive word" and "topic" methods of the Federal Reporter, Second Series.26 This approach consists of several steps.2' Initially
the "criminal law" category in the index of each volume was examined
for the years 1956-1969.28 Criminal law subheadings ("key words") in
these volumes were inspected for appropriate topics. After discovering
which cases were decided en banc, these were read to insure against
misclassifications.2 9 Then other topics relating to criminal issues were
cross-referenced to guard against the omission of pertinent litigation.
24 See Ulmer, The Dimensionality of Judicial Voting Behavior, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. ScL
471 (1969) and Spaeth, Unidimensionality and Item Invariance in Judicial Scaling, 10 BEHAVIORAL SCINCE 290 (1965) for explanations of the concept of unidimensionality.
25
Moreover, research has disclosed that attitudes concerning criminal justice questions
tend to correlate highly with those in a number of other areas. See Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2, at 494.
26

See M. PRICE & H.

BITNER, EFFECrivE LEGAL RESEARCH

205-6 (1969) for discussion

of the "descriptive word" and "topic" methods.
27
In designing this approach several considerations were kept in mind. It can be argued
first of all that any scheme of classification is vulnerable to influence by the classifier's values.
Descriptions of conservatism and liberalism, whether behavioral or traditional in nature,
thus can contain inaccuracies because of fallacious classification of litigation and votes.
See, e.g., Mendeison, supra note 19, at 594-95. In a related vein, Joel B. Grossman has
asserted that since judges may be responding to different variables in complex, multifaceted
litigation, the researcher frequently does not know how to classify or interpret accurately
a vote according to a particular judge's perspective. It follows from this argument that in
cases which involve criminal as well as other issues, one does not always know if a judge
primarily cast a vote in relation to the criminal variable. Even if a judge explains in an
opinion the reasons for his vote, such explanations may be partial only. Subconscious
reasons may not be perceived by a judge. See Grossman, Role Playing and the Analysis of
Judicial Behavior: The Case of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 11 J. PUB. L. 285, 293 (1962).
Beyond this, even if cases are accurately classified, analysis may lack precision because
conservatism and liberalism often vary in consistency and intensity over time in different
issues. Some of the foregoing considerations are also touched upon in Ulmer, Leadership
in the Michigan Supreme Court, in JUDICIAL DECIsION-MAxINo 13, 16 (G. Schubert ed.
1963).
28In the case of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the specialized reports for that circuit may be substituted. See the REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS: DISTRICT OF CoLUmMA. The reason behind such a
substitution should be clear: it is economical. Instead of collecting data from the index

of the

FEDERAL REPORTER-which

includes decisions from all eleven courts of appeals plus

the U.S. Emergency Court of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
and the U.S. Court of Claims--the specialized reports shorten the time required for collection of identical data.
29 Errors and omissions by the publisher are unavoidable in view of the numbers of
cases involved. Therefore, each case was read prior to classification rather than initially
relying solely on the index of the FEDERAL REPORTER. Nor were digests, such as the MoDmwz
FEDERAL PRACTICE DIGEST, relied upon to aid in initial classification. See the related corn-
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Exact standards were established for inclusion and exclusion of
data. Only nonunanimous en banc court decisions were included. In relation to cases jointly decided, all those causing a split on the court
were considered separate cases for the universe of data." Opinions
concurring in part and dissenting in part were classified either as a
dissent or a concurrence, depending on the principal thrust of a judge's
opinion. This determination, admittedly involving a value judgment,
was made only after careful analysis of the opinions. Finally, the reliability of inclusion and exclusion of data was checked against other
research involving the same cases.3 1
ATTITUDES OVER TIME

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has long been recognized as one of the leading and most distinguished appellate courts in the nation. Indeed, in terms of its influence, the court has recently been labeled the "Mini Supreme Court"
by one observer. 2 During the years under consideration, fourteen judges
served on the court for varying periods of time. They included Judges
Walter M. Bastian, David L. Bazelon, Warren E. Burger, John A.
Danaher, Henry J. Edgerton, Charles Fahy, Harold Leventhal, Carl
McGowan, Wilbur K. Miller, E. Barrett Prettyman, Spottswood W.
Robinson, III, Edward A. Tamm, George T. Washington, and J. Skelly
Wright."3 The strong attitudinal and philosophical cleavages which have
ments in M. PRicE & H. BrrmER, supra note 26, at 188; Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions and Rules of Law in JVDIcIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 27, at 133, 135.
30
G. ScHuBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs OF JUDICIAL BErAVIoR, supra note 4, at 79.

See also 3.Sprague, supra note 22, at 77-8.
3
1 Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of
Appeals, supra note 2, at 636; S. Goldman, Politics, Judges, and the Administration of
Justice: The Backgrounds, Recruitment, and Decisional Tendencies of Judges on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 1961-4, 331-33 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in the Harvard University Library, 1965); The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 1968-1969 Term, 58 GEo. L.J. 80 (1969); The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit: 1967-1968 Term, 57 Gao..L.J. 311 (1968); The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 1966-1967 Term, 56 GEo.
L.J. 58 (1967); The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
1965-1966 Term, 55 Gao. L.J. 1 (1966); The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 1964-1965 Term, 54 Gao. L.J. 185 (1965).
323 . GOULDEN, THE BE NcrwARmmEs: TE

PRvIATE WORLD OF

=

PoWErFUL FEDERAL

JUDGES ch. 6 (1974).
33

Tbe period of regular active service on the circuit for each judge is as follows: Bastian,
Circuit Judge, December 15, 1954 through March 16, 1965; Bazelon, Circuit Judge, February 24, 1950 through October 8, 1962 and Chief Judge October 9, 1962 through the present;
Burger, Circuit Judge, April 13, 1956 through June 23, 1969; Danaber, Circuit Judge, November 20, 1953 through January 22, 1969; Edgerton, Circuit Judge, February 1, 1938

through May 29, 1955 and Chief Judge, May 30, 1955 through October 20, 1958; Fahy,
Circuit Judge, December 15, 1949 through April 13, 1967; Leventhal, Circuit Judge, April
20, 1965 through the present; McGowan, Circuit Judge, April 22, 1963 through the present;
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separated these judges are matters of common knowledge among those
who have followed the court over the years. 4
Figure I provides a cumulative scale of fifty-three nonunanimous
en banc criminal cases decided by the court between 1956 and 1969. 35
By thus applying cumulative scaling it becomes evident that the most
conservative court members over these 13 years were Judges Miller and
Bastian. Judge Tamm is depicted to be as conservative as Judge Miller,
Miller, Circuit Judge, October 16, 1945 through October 21, 1960 and Chief Judge, October
22, 1960 through October 9, 1962; Prettyman, Circuit Judge, October 17, 1945 through
October 20, 1958 and Chief Judge, October 21, 1958 through October 21, 1960; Robinson,
Circuit Judge, November 9, 1966 through the present; Tamm, Circuit Judge, March 17, 1965
through the present; Washington, Circuit Judge, May 16, 1950 through November 19, 1965;
Wright, Circuit Judge, April 1962 through the present. Dates are taken from the CoNGmssioNAL DIRECTORY.
84 See, e.g., Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, supra note 2; Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense-Judicial
Philosophy and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Appeals, supra note 2; Loeb, supra
note 12.
85 Cases included in Figure 1 are: Williams v. District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638
(D.C. Cir. 1969); Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Irby v.
United States, 390 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Green v. United States, 389 F.2d 949 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 387 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Harris v. United States,
370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Sampson v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
White v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Harrison v. United States, 359
F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Coleman v. United States, 357 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Green v. United States, 351 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Gordon v. United States, 348 F.2d
84 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Whalem v.
United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C.
Cir. 1964); Short v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Jones v United States,
342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Coleman v. United States, 334 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Jamison v. Chappell, 318 F.2d 225
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Williamson v. Chappell, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Whitling v.
Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Jatoft v. Chappell, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241
(D.C. Cir. 1962); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Jenkins v.
United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618 (D.C.
Cir. 1962); Jones v. United States, 304 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hansford v. United
States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Jones v. United States, 296 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Coleman v. United States, 295 F.2d 555 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Harling v. United States,
295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Lampe v. United States, 288 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d
388 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Hodges v. United States, 282 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Stewart v.
United States, 275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C.
Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Brandon v. United
States, 270 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1959); King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Brown v. United States, 264
F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Trilling v. United States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Edmonds v. United States, 260 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Belton v. United States, 259
F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright
v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Ellis v. United States, 249 F.2d 478 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Rettig v. United
States, 239 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir.
1956). These criminal justice cases correspond to the total number of nonunanimous en
banc decisions delivered during the years in which Warren Burger was a court member.
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but limited data on Tamm's voting tendencies qualifies this conclusion.3
Next in conservatism rank Judges Danaher and Prettyman. Because
their scale scores are substantially higher than Miller's and Bastian's, the
voting of Danaher and Prettyman may be accurately described as
moderately conservative in these criminal cases.37 In contrast to Danaher
and Prettyman, Judge Burger was slightly less conservative. Court
members leaning more toward liberalism included Judges Robinson,
Leventhal, McGowan, Washington, Wright, Fahy, Edgerton, and
Bazelon. Generally speaking, Bazelon, Edgerton, Fahy, and Wright
appear to have been approximately as liberal in these criminal questions
as Miller, Bastian, and presumably Tamm were sympathetic toward the
prosecution. These findings verify those of Professor Atkins for the
1956-1962 portion of the case universe."8 They also are generally consistent with those obtained by Professor Goldman"9 who recently concluded that between 1965 and 1971 there were major differences between the criminal law attitudes of Democratic and Republican members
of the United States Courts of Appeals.4"
Through the use of time subscales, shifts with age along the attitudinal continuum may be detected. A plausible secondary hypothesis
derived from Figure 1 is that Judge-now Chief Justice-Warren
Burger was the court's most moderate member during the early portion
of the 1956 to 1969 period. True, Burger was more attitudinally in line
with conservative than liberal court members for the entire period. But
36 Judge Tamm's general voting behavior between 1969 and 1971 does, however, seem
to substantiate this tentative conclusion as to his basic conservatism. See Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, supra note 2, at
655. Furthermore, Judge Tamm's conservatism in criminal justice questions would be
expected, for during the 1930's and 1940's he served as "chief assistant to FBI Director
J. Edgar Hoover and had been involved in such exploits as the captures of Bruno Richard
Hauptmann, John Dillinger and 'Ma' Barker and her gang... ." Judge Tamm, Leventha
Get Appeals Court Posts, Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1965, § 1, at 1, col. 6. From 1948 until his
appointment to the appeals court during the winter of 1965, Tamm served as district
judge on the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
37 Throughout this article the last consistent positive vote of a judge is usually referred to as his "scale score," although some writers refer to that vote as establishing a
judge's "scale position."
38 See Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts
of Appeals, supra note 2, at 636.
3
9 See Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note
2, at4 0496-97.
Of the liberal judges shown in Figure 1, Bazelon, Wright, and Fahy identify themselves as Democrats. See WHo's WHo IN AMERICA (38th ed. 1974). No party identification
is indicated in this source (either in the 1974 edition or in earlier ones) for liberal to moderately liberal Judges Edgerton, Washington, McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson. Prettyman was also a Democrat. See WHo's WHo IN GOVERNMENT 407 (1st ed. 1972). On the
conservative side of Figure 1, Danaher and Bastian identify themselves as Republicans.
See WHo's WHo IN AMERICA (38th ed. 1974). Likewise, Burger is a Republican. See CuRRENT BIOGRAPHY 62 (1969). The two remaining conservative judges, Tamm and Miller,
did not divulge their party identifications in the above sources.
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while McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson appear more moderate than
Burger in Figure 1, they joined the court after 1962.41 Thus, whether
Burger was the court's most moderate member during these earlier years
is tested through the time subscales summarized in Table 1.
The left side of this table substantiates the secondary hypothesis
in large degree. Between 1956 and 1962 the court decided twenty-nine
nonunanimous criminal cases en banc.4" Judge Burger's scale score of
14 positions him in the center of the nine judges when Wright, with
only two votes, is not considered. 3 Since, ideally, a moderate judge
is located at the center of the ranking and evenly splits his votes for
the appellant and the prosecution, Burger may be viewed as the court's
most moderate member, casting 45 percent of his votes for appellants. 44
With respect to other court members, Table 1 does not disclose dramatic
attitudinal changes. Judges Miller and Bastian were once again the
most pro-government members of the court. Bazelon, Edgerton, Fahy,
and to a lesser extent Washington constituted the liberal wing. Judges
Prettyman and Danaher voted slightly more conservatively than did
Burger.
Attitudinal fluctuations on the court between 1963 and 1969 are
clarified by the right side of Table .' Judge Burger's voting behavior
once more demands attention in order to test the primary hypothesis
that conservatism and age are associated. Although not the most conservative member of the court during this period, he was significantly
more apt to vote for the prosecution after 1962 than he was previously,
regardless of changes in the court's membership.4 6 New appointments
to the court made Burger appear even more conservative, as he moved to
a ranking of ninth out of fourteen in scale scores.4 Of the five new
court members only Judge Tamm, an appointee of President Johnson,
voted more conservatively than Burger. Attitudes of Judges Wright,
McGowan, Leventhal, and Robinson all tended to be more sympathetic
41See note 33 supra.
42
See note 35 supra.
43

Wright's two votes were cast in the important cases of Killough v. United States,

315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962), and McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
44 Since Burger is located in the center of the scale and was a member of the court
majority in most of these cases, this would seem to indicate that his role was crucial in
these criminal law and procedure decisions. See the related comments in Schubert, Judicial
Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29
LAW & CONTEarP. PROB. 100, 122-23 (1963); Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme
Court: A Psychological Analysis, 56 Am. PoL. Sci. REv. 90, 99 (1962).
46
See note 35 supra for the 24 en banc cases decided during these years.
46 Fifty-five percent of Burger's votes were cast against criminal appellants prior to
1963. This figure soared to 83 percent thereafter. See also note 60 infra.
47
See note 33 supra.
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TABLE 1
Tim SUBSCALES: 1956-1962 AND 1963-1969

Judge

Scale Scores
1956-1962

Scale Score Rank
1956-1962*

Judge

Scale Scores
1963-1969

Scale Score Rank
1963-1969*

Bazelon

29

1

Bazelon

24

1.5

Edgerton

28

2.5

Edgerton

24

1.5

Fahy

28

2.5

Wright

19

3.5

Washington

24

4

Fahy

19

3.5

Wright

1s

5

McGowan

12

6

Burger

14

6

Levanthal

12

6

Prettyman

13

7

Robinson

12

6

Danaher

10

8

Washington

11

8

Bastian

3

9

Burger

5

9

Miller

0

10

Danaher

1

10

Prettyman

0

12.5

Tamm

0

12.5

Bastian

0

12.5

Miller

0

12.5

CS =.944

N=24

CR

.991

CS=.956

N = 29

CR =.991

* For purposes of this table, scale score ranks are averaged when two or more judges are

tied for the same rank.
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toward criminal appellants than Burger's. Wright normally agreed with
Judges Bazelon, Edgerton, and Fahy. On the other hand, McGowan,
Leventhal, Robinson, and Washington seem to have replaced Burger
as the court's most moderate element. Judges Miller and Bastian remained staunchly conservative.
Aside from the secondary hypothesis concerning Judge Burger,
voting by other court members in Table 1 also reflects notable changes
in judicial attitudes, although these were not always accompanied by
profound shifts in the judges' scale rankings. Judge Danaher was clearly less likely to vote in favor of criminal appellants in divided en banc
panels after 1963 than before, yet his scale position changed from eight
of ten to ten of fourteen.4 8 Judge Fahy grew considerably less liberal, voting 93 percent of the time for appellants in the left side of
Table 1, but only 72 percent for them on the right. Judge Washington's
attitudes appear to have changed, too. His scale ranking increased from
four of ten to eight of fourteen, while his tendency to cast votes in favor
of the prosecution rose from 59 to 86 percent. By contrast, the voting
tendencies and scale positions of the four judges at the extremes of the
scales-Bazelon, Edgerton, Bastian, and Miller-changed only slightly.49
To this point scaling has demonstrated that the attitudes of certain
appeals court judges did become somewhat more conservative over time.
This is most clearly seen in the case of Judge Burger, who nevertheless
was not the most conservative court member throughout his years on
the appeals bench, as some commentators have suggested.5" Indeed,
during Burger's first seven years on the court his attitudes are most
accurately described as moderate, rather than primarily pro-government. Yet a conservative change in Burger's attitudes definitely occurred;
48 Prior to 1963 Danaher voted 34 percent of the time in favor of criminal claims.
This decreased to 4 percent between 1963 and 1969.
49 Compare this finding to that of S. Sidney Ulmer, who has concluded from Supreme
Court research that "Justices usually identified as 'liberal' seem to have been more stable
than those usually classified as 'conervative.'" Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Subgroup Forination in the United States Supreme Court, 27 J. POL. 133, 151 (1965). Also compare it
with the idea that conservatives, but not liberals, normally possess relatively rigid attitudes.
See, e.g., McClosky, Conservatisn; and Personality, 52 Am. POL. Sca. REv. 27, 38 (1958).
See generally
Kendall & Cary, Towards a Definition of Conservatism, 26 J. PoL. 406 (1964).
5
0Several such assessments emerged during the early summer of 1969 when Burger was
being considered by the Senate for confirmation as Chief Justice. As an example, a prominent District of Columbia lawyer is said to have noted that Burger had "certainly been
the most conservative member of the Court of Appeals" for the District of Columbia Circuit Zion, Nixon's Nominee for the Post of Chief Justice: Warren Earl Burger, N.Y.
Tunes, May 22, 1969, § 1, at 36. Another commentator agreed that Burger was the "most
vigorous conservative in criminal law" on the District of Columbia Appeals Court. Lippman, Legacy of Burger: A History of Dissents, Wash. Post, May 22, 1969, §1, at 18. See
generally J. Srmoss, IN His OwN ImsOn: Tma SuPRarx CouRTr PcRRAR
s
NxoN,'s A.ReaiCA ch. 4 (1973) for a further description of aspects of Burger's conservatism.
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his voting behavior became considerably more conservative after 1962.51
By constructing subscales involving even shorter time spans, one can
more precisely identify this important shift in his attitudes. The scales
summarized in Table 2 serve this purpose.
The left portion of Table 2 reflects the ten nonunanimous en banc
criminal decisions handed down by the court during Warren Burger's
initial three years' tenure.2 As suggested by analysis of Table I, Burger
may be described as the court's most moderate member during the 1956
through 1958 terms. His scale score, middle ranking, and voting evenly
for both the prosecution and appellants supply the basis for this conclusion.5" In comparison, Judge Burger behaved only slightly more
conservatively from 1959 to 1964, as demonstrated by the center column
of Table 2.' He remained moderate to moderately conservative in relation to his colleagues. Once more Burger is located in the center of
the ranking, voting 41 percent in favor of appellants' claims.
The major shift in Judge Burger's attitudes in criminal justice
issues, relative to those of his colleagues, is revealed in the last column
of Table 2." In the five years prior to President Nixon's appointment
of Burger as Chief Justice, he appears as conservative as any member
of the court. Not only was he tied for last place in scale scores,5 6 but
Burger also failed to cast a single vote in favor of an appellant in the
fourteen en banc decisions handed down between 1965 and 1969." In
contrast, apparent shifts in the attitudes of other court members between
1965 and 1969 were not nearly so dramatic. Some of the changes in
judges' ranks were, moreover, due to not being on the court during
portions of the period,5" or due to a single vote. 9
51 This conclusion apparently contradicts the position of columnist John P. MacKenzie,
a long-time observer of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. At the
time of Burger's elevation to Chief justice, MacKenzie wrote that "Outside the confessions area Burger surprised liberals by the way his views have mellowed over the
years, especially in such matters as the right of the accused to trial and appellate counsel."
MacKenzie, Burger's Style Indicates He Won't Change Court Overnight, Wash. Post, June 2,
1969, § 1, at 2, col. 7.
52 See notes 33 & 35 supra.
53 Half of Burger's votes in these ten cases were cast in support of the appellant.
54 See note 35 supra for the 29 en bauc cases decided during these years.
55 See note 35 supra for the 14 en bane cases decided during these years.
56 Danaher is -placed below Burger in the right portion of Table 2 simply because of
the rule for alphabetically ranking judges who are tied for last place and whose scale
scores are zero. See G. SCHIBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JuDIcIAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 4, at 286.
57 See Burger's votes shown in Figure 1, supra. For the cases see note 35 supra.
58 This occurred in the cases of Judges Washington, Bastian, and Miller. See note
33 supra.
59 This occurred in the case of Judge Bazelon. The single vote was cast in Harris v.
United States, 370 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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A note of warning is in order, however. As in most studies of this
type, the voting fluctuations by Judge Burger and his colleagues are
thought to be chiefly explained by the major independent variableattitudes. That is, as their attitudes in criminal law and procedure grew
more conservative with age, their voting followed a path more supportive of the prosecution. Yet a number of additional, extremely complicated factors may have contributed to these changes, for it would
be premature to assert that the attitudinal variable totally explains all
variances in behavior.
The court's altered composition between 1962 and 1965 presents
one possible explanation for some voting shifts.6" E. Barrett Prettyman
retired from regular active service in April 1962 and was replaced by
J. Skelly Wright, a liberal. Likewise, Henry Edgerton withdrew from
the bench in April 1963. The new appointee, Carl McGowan, was
moderately liberal. Then in October 1964, Wilbur K. Miller retired from
active service, although he continued to participate periodically in a
number of cases as senior circuit judge. Walter N. Bastian followed
Miller in March 1965. Their replacements were Edward A. Tamm and
Harold Leventhal, the former a consistent conservative, the latter essentially a moderate. 6 '
These changes in court personnel could have influenced to some
immeasurable extent the voting behavior of remaining members of the
court. Patterns of group interaction were altered; old judicial relationships terminated and new ones-with for the most part more liberal or
moderate colleagues-were forced to develop. Moreover, in the case
of Judge Burger it is important that David L. Bazelon became chief
judge of the court in October 1962. Since Burger and Bazelon often
expressed Vigorously opposing philosophies of criminal procedure and
law, 2 this alteration of formal court leadership may have affected Burger's behavior and influence." Other possible explanations for voting
60
This explanation is advanced in an unpublished paper by Professor Burton M. Atkins.
Atkins, The Longitudinal Context of Judicial Behavior: The Case of Chief Justice Warren
Burger 14-16 (1973). However, while this reasoning has merit, the attitudinal shift thesis
is primarily adopted here since in the scaled cases Burger did not cast a single vote for
criminal defendants after 1964. Although new appointments shifted the court toward the
left, Burger's voting nevertheless became clearly more conservative with age.
61 See note 35 supra for the specific dates of changes in the court's membership mentioned above.
62 See Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure,
1956-1969, supra note 2; Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense-Judicial Philoso4'Iy and Voting Behavior on a U.S. Court of Appeals, supra note 2. See also MacKenzie,

Warren E. Burger, in 4 THE JUsTICEs oF THE UNITED STATES SUPREMtE COURT 1789-1969:

Tnm LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIoNs 3111 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969).
63 Research on Supreme Court leadership seems to provide some insights here. See
S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNiGE, supra note 7, at 180-82; Danelski, The Influence of the Chief
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shifts may involve the types of criminal cases coming before the court.
For instance, they may have been of a different character or related to
new liberal precedents announced by the Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, the principal conclusion here is that some judges' attitudes seem to have changed markedly with age, irrespective of changes
in court composition or types of cases appealed. Simply put, these judges
appear to have grown considerably less sympathetic to criminal appellants' claims over time. But while this explanation receives emphasis
here, the point to be remembered is that other plausible explanations
could involve a combination of the above factors, or more complex and
numerous ones. In this sense, then, cumulative scaling is of limited value
in clarifying the inherent complexities hidden within the original
hypothesis.
Through the use of time subscales, judicial attitudes of certain
members of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
have been demonstrated to change longitudinally in nonunanimous en
banc criminal law and procedure decisions. These changes were most
substantial in the cases of Judges Burger, Danaher, Fahy, and Washington. Cumulative scaling is next applied to two subsets of criminal
justice cases during the same period to test the second hypothesis-that
although these judges became more conservative with age, the extent
of that growing conservatism fluctuated among specific issues.
ATTITUDES ON SPECIFIC ISSUES

John D. Sprague has observed that the application of bloc analysis
to aggregate Supreme Court data may yield misleading conclusions, and
that narrowly defined issues often provide a more meaningful identification of voting blocs.64 The same reasoning applies to cumulative
scaling of voting on the United States Courts of Appeals. Moreover,
it applies to specific issues within a subset of a total universe of data,'
such as criminal law and procedure decisions. The proposition tested
here is that while a judge may vote conservatively in criminal issues
generally, his attitudes will vary in direction and intensity on particular
questions of criminal law and procedure.65 These distinctions in voting
Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court in THE

FEDERAL JUDIciAL SYsTEm:

READnNGs rn PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR 147 (T. Jahnige & S. Goldman eds. 1968). See also

Atkins, Decision-Making Rules and Judicial Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals, supra note 2.
64 J. SPRAG E, supra note 22, at 44.
65 Writing in general terms, Professor David Spitz has stated this hypothesis somewhat
more broadly: "it is perhaps as often the case that men are both liberal and conservative
as that they are either of these alone." Spitz, A Liberal Perspective on Liberalism and Con-

servatism, in LEnt,

RIGHT AND CENTER: ESSAYS ON LiBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN THE

UNITED STATES 18, 19 (R.

Goldman ed. 1967).
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behavior and judicial attitudes should receive greater attention than
they have in the past. They also are one essential means of refining a
test of the hypothesis that judges become more conservative with age.6"
Whereas the preceding pages have analyzed voting in the general
fiield of criminal law and procedure with trends detected over time,
this section presents an illustration of judicial policy preferences with
respect to specific substantive issues. To be sure, this is not a new conceptual approach to studying judicial voting behavior. As early as 1948
C. Herman Pritchett pointed out virtually the same type of distinctions
in his classic book, The Roosevelt Court." However, this approach is
unusual in appeals court research, chiefly because of inadequate data on
narrowly-defined issues. For purposes of the illustration, one criminal
procedure issue (unnecessary delays in preliminary hearings) and one
criminal law issue (criminal responsibility in insanity pleas) are chosen
for examination.6
The major point emerges from examination of Table 3: while
attitudes of certain members of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit became more conservative over time in criminal
cases generally,69 this evolving conservatism is distinguishable from the
standpoint of specific criminal questions. The left side of Table 3 depicts the results of a cumulative scale for nine unnecessary delay cases
announced by a nonunanimous court sitting en banc.7 ° Judicial voting
66 See the hypotheses stated in the text accompanying note 11 supra.
67 C. PRITCHETT, TuE RoOsEvELT COURT: A STUDY IN JuDIcrAL PoLITTCS AIM VALUES

1937-1947 141 (1948). Pritchett found a great deal of fluctuation in the voting behavior
of particular justices when different criminal issues were considered. For example, Justice
Felix Frankfurter's vote in favor of criminal defendants varied from 100 percent in search
and seizure questions to 0.0 percent where jury trial issues were involved. Similar fluctuations were evident in the voting of Justices Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, Robert
H. Jackson, and Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone. These and other considerations led Professor Pritchett to a conclusion which applies not only to the justices of the Supreme
Court but also to the judges on the United States Court of Appeals:
One is tempted, in reviewing these decisions where the interpretation of constitutional standards for criminal prosecutions is at issue, to feel that here the
autobiographical factor plays a larger part than in any other significant area of
judicial action. The product seems so clearly to be personal rather than institutional.
It is harder here for judges to cast their private judgments in the form of logical
deductions from established precedents. It is harder to give the impression that
they are merely finding the law, not making it up out if their heads, or hearts.
Id. at 158.
6SFor a legal analysis of cases in these specific areas see Lamb, The Making of a
Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, supra note 2, at 768-77;
Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense-Judicial Philosophy and Voting Behavior
on a U.S. Court of Appeals, supra note 2, at 98-115.
69 See Tables 1 and 2 supra.
70 Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Short v. United States, 342
F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Killough
v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Naples v. United States, 307 F.2d 618
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Starr v. United States, 264 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Trilling v. United
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TABLE 3
ISSUE SUBSCALES: UNNECESSARY DELAYS AND CRnnNAL INSANnTY

Judge

Scale Scores In
Unnecessary
Delay Decisions

Scale
Score
Rank*

Bazelon

9

2

Edgerton

9

2

Fahy

9

Washington

Scale Scores In
Criminal
Insanity Decisions

Scale
Score
Rank*

Bazelon

14

1.5

Wright

14

1.5

2

Edgerton

13

3.5

8

4

Faby

13

3.5

Wright

7

5

Washington

11

5

Burger

6

6

Levanthal

8

7

Danaher

3

7

Robinson

8

7

Prettyman

2

8

McGowan

8

7

Bastian

0

9.5

Burger

7

9

Miller

0

9.5

Prettyman

6

10

Danaher

5

11

Bastian

2

12

Tamm

0

13.5

Miller

0

13.5

CS = 1.00

N= 14

CR

.988

CS =.909

N=9

Judge

CR=1.00

* For purposes of this table, scale score ranks are averaged when two or more judges are

tied for the same rank.
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patterns in these decisions are quite similar to those evident in Figure
1."' Judges Bazelon, Edgerton, Fahy, Washington, and Wright are
shown to be the court's more liberal members; Judges Miller, Bastian,
Prettyman, and Danaher tended to consistently vote conservatively.
As in Figure 1 and Table 1, Burger appears to have played a pivotal
role in the court's decisionmaking process. 72
Interesting points are suggested, however, by contrasting the two
issues analyzed in Table 3. In the court's fourteen en blanc split decisions involving criminal responsibility in insanity pleas,7

8

Judges

Prettyman, Bastian, and Burger voted somewhat differently than they
did in unnecessary delay litigation. This difference is most noticeable
in Judge Prettyman's case. In unnecessary delay questions he voted 25
percent of the time in favor of criminal appellants, while maintaining a
scale position of eight, out of ten judges. But in criminal insanity issues
Prettyman was considerably more moderate, voting 56 percent for
appellants, with a scale position of ten, out of fourteen judges. All
this is to say that Prettyman's attitudes differed more significantly in
criminal insanity cases than in Figure 1, and that he and Burger constituted the court's more moderate element in questions of insanity.7 4
States, 260 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Rettig v. United States, 239 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Green v. United States, 236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The first three citations
above are counted separately for purposes of the case universe. See note 30 supra & text
accompanying.
The left side of Table 3 reflects an acceptable scaling attempt (a "quasi-scale"), although more cases would have been methodologically desirable. For illustrations of scales
with less than ten cases see G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATiVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR,
supra, note 4 at 334, 354, 361; Goldman, Canflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals 1965-1971:
A Quantitative Analysis, supra note 2, at 655; Peck, A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme
Court of Canada, 1958-1967, in CoPARATvE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES
OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE EAST AND WEST 293, 301-2, 312 (G. Schubert &
D. Danelski eds. 1969); Schubert, Civilian Control and Stare Decisis in the Warren Court,
in JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 27, at 59, 64. See also B. PHILLIPS, SocIAL RESEARCH: STRATEGY AND TACTICS 232 (2d ed. 1971).
71 See Figure 1, supra p. 265. One should also note that although unnecessary delay
litigation has decreased in recent years, it required a substantial amount of the court's
attention during the 1950's and 1960's because of the Supreme Court's policy declarations
in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957). Unnecessary delay claims have become less commonplace in the 1970's largely
due to the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351 (June 19, 1968), 82 Stat. 197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c) (1970).
72 See note 44 supra.
73 Green v. United States, 389 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 387
F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Green v. United States, 351 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Whalem
v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1961); Stewart v. United States, 275 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Blocker v. United
States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Smith v. United States, 270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Wright v. United States,
250 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Stewart v. United States, 247 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
74 See text acompanying notes 41-47 supra.
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In the case of Judge Bastian there was a 15 percent greater chance
that he would cast his vote in support of the appellant when an insanity
plea was offered than when the appellant claimed an unnecessary delay
in preliminary hearings, and there was an 8 percent greater likelihood that he would support an appellant than in criminal appeals generally, as depicted in Figure I." Judge Burger, like Prettyman, was
more prone to vote for appellants in unnecessary delay decisions than
in those pertaining to criminal insanity." Still, it is obvious that between the years 1956 and 1969, Judge Burger was more moderate in
both of these issues than in criminal litigation generally.7" Finally, in
contrast to Prettyman, Bastian, and Burger, the voting patterns of
other court members apparently remained relatively stable, regardless of
specific issues and their normal liberal, moderate, or conservative leanings. 8
With reference to the age variable, one might think that some
judges' views did not shift in connection with specific issues because
they did not significantly vacilate according to Tables 1 and 2. Nevertheless, just as there were fluctuations in some judicial attitudes over time
in criminal cases generally,7' Table 3 reflects a few associations between age and conservatism in specific criminal questions. These shifts
are most obvious in the voting of Judges Danaher and Burger. Before
1962 Danaher voted 50 percent of the time in favor of appellants claiming unnecessary delays, but voted in favor only 20 percent of the time
thereafter. However, in contradiction to the second hypothesis, prior to
1962 Burger supported unnecessary delay claims at a rate of 25 percent;
this increased markedly to 80 percent between 1962 and 1969.80 Quite
different changes are seen in Burger's attitudes in the right side of
Table 3. Between 1956 and 1961 he voted 62.5 percent for appellants in
criminal insanity pleas, but between 1962 and 1969 that rate dropped
to 33.3 percent.' Viewed from a slightly different standpoint in time,
between 1956 and 1962 Burger supported appellants in 70 percent of
claims, yet he supported none of four appellants during the period 19631969. Danaher similarly cast half of his votes in favor of these appellants
before 1963, but none of four votes afterwards.
75

See Figure 1, supra page 265.

76 Burger's voting was 56 percent in favor of unnecessary delay assertions, compared

to 50 percent in support of the appellant in insanity issues.
77 Burger cast 32 percent of his votes in favor of criminal appellants in Figure 1,
supra p. 265. Compare this percentage to those in note 76 supra.
78 Compare Figure 1 with Table 3.
7
9 See Tables 1 & 2 supra. See generally text accompanying notes 45-59 supra.
80
See cases listcd note 57 supra.
81
See cases listed note 59 supra.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51 :257

CONCLUSION

The thrust of this article has been to underscore and extend recent
advances in the examination of judicial attitudes on the United States
Courts of Appeals through the use of cumulative scaling. More specifically, drawing upon criminal decisions of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit for illustrative purposes, cumulative scaling
has been shown of value for (a) detecting shifting judicial attitudes
on the court of appeals over time as judges age, and (b) determining
the degree to which attitudes may vary with age in specific criminal
questions.
Hypotheses introduced earlieru have not been squarely supported
by the voting data of all the judges, but conclusions drawn from these
illustrations are nevertheless suggestive. Attitudes of several court members were relatively flexible over time, with voting patterns occasionally
changing through the years. In a few cases (like that of Judges Fahy
and Washington) this gradual attitudinal shift was away from the
liberal wing of the court. In others (including Judges Burger and
Danaher) the trend was away from moderation and toward conservatism. But importantly, in no instance over time did a conservative judge
consistently shift to join his moderate or liberal colleagues in voting
in criminal cases generally. Simply stated, where significant attitudinal
changes did occur with age, judges became more conservative. While
this confirms the first hypothesis in part, it does not say that judges
become more conservative only because of age.8" More comprehensive,
methodologically sophisticated research would be required to entertain
this question.
Judicial policy preferences also varied with respect to different
criminal issues. Of the two issues examined, a few judges (Prettyman
and, to a lesser extent, Burger) were more prone to vote in favor of
appellants claiming an unnecessary delay in preliminary hearings, while
another judge (Bastian) was more inclined to support insanity pleas.
Apart from this, some attitudes shifted over time within these specific
areas (as in the cases of Judges Burger and Bastian). Accordingly, in
82 See text acompanying note 11 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra. Briefly stated, the position here is that
research provides substantial evidence that personal attitudes of judges have a strong,
normally subconscious influence on their behavior. However, the position also is that
no one factor alone-be it judicial attitudes, individual perceptions of the proper judicial
role, institutional structures and procedures, or external political, legal, social, or economic
influences-completely explains judicial behavior and its variation with age. See also the
discussion in Tanenhaus, Supreme Court Attitudes Toward Federal Administrative Agencies,
1947-1956-An Application of Social Science Methods to the Study of the Judicial Process,
14 VAND. L. REV. 473, 482-84 (1961).
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specific issues there were occasional variances in voting tendencies by
court members: conservatives in one area were shown to be moderate
in another; moderates were shown to join their liberal or conservative
colleagues in other questions. Still, in specific issues there was little
variance in the voting of most judges over the years.
Concluding words of caution are in order with respect to future
research utilizing scaling to examine attitudes on the courts of appeals.
Voting data from the other ten appeals courts are often not as amendable
to scaling as with the District of Columbia Circuit, which has experienced relatively high rates of en banc split decisions over the past
two decades. 4 Also, criminal law and procedure have been a particular
cause of division and disharmony on the District of Columbia Court. 5
Voting in other issue-areas may therefore be less responsive to scaling.
Furthermore, appeals court cases decided en banc are by their very
nature somewhat atypical of all those decided, and any generalizing from
the conclusions of this article must remain conditional. The attitudes of
a particular judge as depicted by cumulative scaling may differ slightly
from the attitudes of the same individual when voting in three-judge
panels is inspected through another approach."8
These possible limitations notwithstanding, scaling will likely grow
as a valuable tool for future attitudinal investigations. Appeals court
research has been neglected in the past by many of those interested in
judicial behavior and process. Although there has been progress over
the last decade, and although some serious problems have already been
solved, much remains to be accomplished. Some of this can be achieved
through the selective, proper use of cumulative scaling, either alone or
87
in combination with other quantitative techniques.
84

For example, Professor Goldman has found that for all eleven courts of appeals between 1965 and 1971, only about one half of 1 percent of all decisions were made en bane.

See Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2, at
493 n.7. The rate of en bane decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is, however, comparatively high. See Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals
1965-1971: A Quantitative Analysis, supra note 2, at 638.
85
See note 34 supra & text accompanying.

8
6This can be pursued through the use of decision scores. For explanations of this
simple technique and its application see S. Nagel, supra note 18, at 181, 185; Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. Caom. L.C. & P.S. 333 (1962); Nagel, Testing
Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial Decision-Making, 15 WEsT. PoL.
Q. 425 (1962); Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 Am. PoL. Sc.

REv. 843 (1961). See also the application of decision scores to voting on the courts of appeals in Lamb, Warren Burger and the Insanity Defense-Judicial Philosophy and Voting

Behavior on a US. Court of Appeals, supra note 2, at 119-21; Lamb, The Making of a
Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, supra note 2, at 750 n.30,

770 n.134, 780 n.188.
87 The latter approach, which is desirable for purposes of verification and interrelationships among attitudinal tendencies, is ably illustrated in Goldman, Voting Behavior on the
US. Courts of Appeals Revisited, supra note 2, at 494-96.

